Anything under the Sun
Assassination of the century (3)
c) “In the light of all the evidence of record, the substance of which is herein before set out, we are satisfied that it is not true, as claimed by the accused, that having gone to the office of the governor merely for the purpose of seeking a license for his revolver, he made use of the revolver in a sudden burst of passion aroused by the unprovoked insults heaped upon him on that occasion; and we are of opinion that the evidence sustains a finding that his real purpose in going to the government building on the morning in question was to take the life of his enemy; that the plan to do so originated in his mind not later than the night before the morning on which the shooting took place; that the plan was persisted in from the early hour at which he left his house until the time when he gained admission to the office of the governor, a period of time long enough to justify us in holding that the crime was committed with deliberate premeditation (premeditacion conocida), because, in a judicial sense, it afforded full opportunity for meditation and reflection, and was amply sufficient to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will (vencer las determinaciones de la voluntad) had he desired to hearken to its warnings; this being the measure of the period of time necessary to justify the interface of deliberate premeditation, as laid down in the case of the United States vs. Ricafor (1 Phil. Rep., 173), adopting the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Spain in its sentencia dated November 10, 1894.”
“We are satisfied, too, that the crime was committed with treachery (alevosia), because the evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, actuated by the hatred engendered by his personal and political quarrel with his enemy, he sought his enemy alone in his office, and upon securing admission opened fire upon his victim, who was at the moment engaged in the transaction of public business and wholly unarmed, without giving him an opportunity to resist or to defend himself.”
Lastly, this case was the first where the Supreme Court ruled on dying declaration, expert witness and premeditation, as appearing in its syllabus:
“RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, DYING DECLARATIONS – The American authors of the Philippine Bill and General Orders No. 58, must be presumed to have borrowed the provisions of the Constitution of the Unites States, securing to accused persons the right of confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses against them, subject to the well-established exceptions which have always been recognized under the rule as laid down by the Constitution of the United States; these provisions were never intended to render inadmissible dying declarations in criminal cases, touching the circumstances leading up to the death for which the prosecution is instituted.
EXPERT WITNESSES – whether the opinion of a witness who claims to be an expert or skilled witness is admissible or not is to be determined by proof of his skill and special knowledge to the subject matter of the particular question propounded; and the existence of the capacity to testify as an expert arises in theory as a new inquiry from question to question.
PREMEDITATION – the period of time necessary to justify the inference of deliberate premeditation is a period sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and sufficient to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its warnings.”